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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: This study aims to analyze the detection of the risk factors of fraudulent financial reporting and 
corporate governance mechanisms as moderating variables with fraud diamond theory of the property and construction 
sector in Indonesia. The risk factors of fraudulent financial reporting by financial targets, ineffective monitoring, auditor 
change, change of directors. 
Methodology: The sample selection using purposive method sampling. The number of population in this study was 219. 
The samples of this study were 114 property and construction sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
during 2016-2018. This study tests the hypothesis in multivariate analysis using logistic regression with IBM SPSS 
Statistics 25. 
Main Findings: The results of this study the board of commissioners, independent commissioners, institutional 
ownership are able to moderate the relationship between financial targets on fraudulent financial reporting. The 
companies are able to optimize corporate governance mechanisms, especially the roles of the board of commissioners, 
independent commissioners, institutional ownership. So, that fraudulent financial reporting in the companies can 
decrease. 
Implications of this study: The results of this study are expected to provide practical implications for companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, namely the need to strengthen the board of commissioners, independent 
commissioners, and institutional ownership to detect and prevent fraudulent financial reporting. The higher effectiveness 
of monitoring will be able to minimize the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Novelty/Originality of this study: This study uses fraud diamond theory to detect and tests the moderating variables of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between the determinant fraudulent financial reporting. The study 
uses a moderating variable that is corporate governance mechanisms which is proxy by the board of commissioners, 
independent commissioners, institutional ownership, and audit committee. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance Mechanism, Fraud Diamond Theory, Fraudulent Financial Reporting, Financial 
Target, Independent Commissioners, Institutional Ownership. 
INTRODUCTION 
Fraud diamond theory is a theory put forward by Wolfe & Hermanson, (2004) adding capability as a complementary 
element of the fraud triangle, namely pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. Opportunity is a door for someone to 
commit fraud, pressure and rationalization can encourage people to do it. However, fraud will not occur without the right 
people with capability (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). In fact, there many people who commit fraud in presenting financial 
statements such as marking up and manipulating the amount of data of financial statements (Irwandi et al., 2019; Ugrin 
& Odom, 2010; Utomo et al., 2019). Fraudulent financial reporting is a deviation from the financial statements. 
Fraudulent financial reporting is common in Indonesia, including PT Waskita Karya. In the middle of 2009, it was 
discovered the financial engineering carried out by the directors of the previous period, there was an excess of profit 
recording by Rp.400 billion. At the end of 2018, PT Waskita Karya was again exposed to fraud cases involving 
managers of PT Waskita Karya, it is suspected that they have recorded 14 fictitious projects and caused the state to 
suffer a loss of Rp.186 billion. Based on the Indonesian Consumers Foundation (YLKI), cases of complaints against 
fraudulent financial reporting in the property sector ranked third in 2014, went up to second place in 2015, and in 2016 it 
still ranked second. In 2017, the property was rank third, and in 2019 complaints against the property ranked third. 
This research is conducted to show inconsistencies in the fraud diamond theory from previous research such as 
Pamungkas et al., (2018), Azizah & Anisykurlillah, (2014), Annisya et al., (2016), Zaki, (2017) show that the financial 
target does not affect the fraudulent financial reporting. Meanwhile, on the studies of Santoso, (2019), Mardiani et al., 
(2017), Nugraheni & Triatmoko, (2016) financial target has an effect on fraudulent financial reporting. The nature of 
industry, research conducted by Zaki, (2017) shows that there is an influence on fraudulent financial reporting. However, 
the research of Nugraheni & Triatmoko, (2016) and Annisya et al., (2016) show that the nature of the industry does not 
affect on fraudulent financial reporting. Research conducted by Mardiani et al., (2017) and Zaki, (2017) show that the 
 Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 8, No 3, 2020, pp 1065-1072 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.83109 
1066 |https://giapjournals.com/hssr/index                                                                                                 © Sari et al. 
auditor change does not affect fraudulent financial reporting. Meanwhile, Santoso, (2019) stated that the auditor change 
has an effect on fraudulent financial reporting. In the research of Pamungkas et al., (2018) the change of directors 
influences fraudulent financial reporting. However, Santoso, (2019), Mardiani, et al., (2017), Annisya et al., (2016) 
shows that the change of directors has no effect on fraudulent financial reporting. 
Based on the background description, the phenomenon and the research gap provide the opportunity for researchers to 
examine the factors that can affect fraudulent financial reporting. There are still inconsistencies in the results of previous 
studies so that motivating and interesting to do further research with the corporate governance mechanism as a 
moderating variable. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fraud Diamond Theory 
This theory assumes that between principal and agent have their respective interests which will lead to a conflict of 
interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Principal as a shareholder wants the company's financial performance to increase so 
that the rate of return on investment is high while management as an agent also has an interest in improving their welfare 
(Nugraheni & Triatmoko, 2016). Managements can easily commit fraud because they have the ability and the 
opportunity to commit fraud (Yusof and Lai, 2014). In 2004, there was a fraud theory that was introduced by Wolfe & 
Hermanson, (2004), the theory known as fraud diamond theory. Research conducted by Wolfe & Hermanson, (2004) 
perfected the theory found by Skousen et al., (2009) by adding the capability element as the fourth element besides 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization, these factors influence someone to commit fraud. Wolfe & Hermanson, (2004) 
argue that a lot of fraud worth billions of dollars cheating will not occur without capability. Opportunity can open a way 
for someone to commit fraud. Still, the person must have the ability to be able to recognize these opportunities. 
Hypothesis Development 
Cases of fraud on these financial statements are common and seize the attention of economists. One of them is the fraud 
diamond theory. Thus, the researchers use corporate governance mechanisms as a moderating variable to prevent 
fraudulent financial reporting in the fraud diamond theory. Company managers strive to improve their performance to 
achieve financial targets that have been planned (Manurung & Hardika, 2015; Pamungkas & Utomo, 2018). Investors 
will be interested in a company if the ROA value of the company is high (Nugraheni & Triatmoko, 2016). Hence, the 
higher the probability of a company commits fraudulent financial reporting by manipulating the numbers in the financial 
statements to look good and achieve the planned targets (Nugraheni & Triatmoko, 2016). This is consistent with the 
opinion of Skousen et al., (2009) uncollectible accounts, and obsolete inventory can be used to identify the time of 
manipulation of financial statements in the company. This argument is supported by Loebbecke et al., (1989) found that 
accounts receivable and inventories accounts were involved in a large number of frauds. 
Rationalization is one of the important factors in fraud. Rationalizing fraud can be easily measured by those who are 
accustomed to dishonesty (Mardiani et al., 2017). Auditor change or public accounting firm is one of the proxies of 
rationalization (Skousen et al., 2009). Higher the public accounting firm switching, the higher the fraud that occurs in the 
company (Pamungkas et al., 2018). Wolfe & Hermanson, (2004) ability is a person's attempt to commit fraud to achieve 
certain goals. Six important elements that exist in capability, namely: position/function, the level of confidence/ego, 
intelligence, coercion skills, immunity to stress, and effective lying (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). Based on these 
characteristics, the positions of directors, CEO, and other division heads are in accordance with the characters. 
The change of directors aims to get rid of old directors who have known fraud committed by the company (Nugraheni & 
Triatmoko, 2016; Pamungkas & Utomo, 2018). The change of directors can cause a stress period, so that it can trigger 
opportunities and chances to do. This is due to the new directors do not fully know about the company, which leads to 
ineffective performance, so it can open up opportunities to commit fraud (Nugraheni & Triatmoko, 2016). The 
effectiveness of the monitoring carried out by the board of commissioners will minimize the occurrence of fraud, despite 
the high level of financial targets, nature of the industry, auditors change, and changes of directors. Dechow et al., (1996) 
also stated that the composition of the board of commissioners is able to prevent fraud action. Pamungkas et al., (2018) 
conclude that the board of independent commissioners can influence fraud because in its supervision it works 
independently. Fraud on these financial statements will be reduced, even though the level of financial targets, the nature 
of the industry, auditors change, and changes of directors in the company are high. 
Another ownership structure is institutional ownership. Institutional shareholders usually take the form of entities such 
as pension funds, mutual funds, banking, and insurance (Das, 2017; Hu & Zhou, 2008). Institutional investors have the 
capability to analyze financial statements directly compared to other investors (Cheung et al., 2015; Ibrani et al., 2019; 
Trisnantari, 2010). The audit committee is the internal party of the company whose job is to assist the board of 
commissioners in ensuring oversight of financial reporting (Santoso, 2019). Anwaar, (2016); Gamayuni, (2015); Utomo 
et al., (2018) stated the company can provide more supervision over management performance so that the existence of 
the audit committee can detect fraudulent financial reporting that exist in the company. The existence of an audit 
committee in a company will minimize the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting in the company despite the 
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financial targets, nature of the industry, auditors change, and change of directors are high. Thus, the researchers can 
formulate a hypothesis as follows: The theoretical framework for examining the effect of financial targets, nature of 
industry, auditors change, changes of directors on fraudulent financial reporting and corporate governance mechanisms 
as moderating variable. 
H1: Financial target has an effect on fraudulent financial reporting. 
H2: Nature of industry has an effect on fraudulent financial reporting. 
H3: Changes in auditors has an effect on fraudulent financial reporting. 
H4: Change of directors has an effect on fraudulent financial reporting. 
H5: Board of commissioners can moderate the relationship of financial targets, nature of the industry, auditor change 
and change of director on fraudulent financial reporting. 
H6: Independent commissioners can moderate the relationship of financial targets, nature of the industry, auditor change 
and change of director to the fraudulent financial reporting. 
H7: Institutional ownership can moderate the relationship of financial targets, nature of the industry, auditor change and 
change of director on fraudulent financial reporting. 
H8: Audit committee can moderate the relationship of financial targets, nature of the industry, auditor change and 
change of director on fraudulent financial reporting. 
 
Figure 1: Research Model 
METHODOLOGY 
This research used quantitative methods and secondary data. The population used in this study are property and 
construction sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for the period of 2016-2018. The sample 
selection was based on purposive method sampling. The number of population in this study was 219, from the sample 
collection, 114 samples were obtained. The following is a sample selection based on predetermined criteria: 
Table 1: Sample Criteria 
No. Sample Criteria 
Number of 
Companies 
1. 
Property and construction sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
in the 2016-2018 periods. 
74 
2. Companies that were not listed on the IDX during the 2016-2018 period. (15) 
3. 
Companies that did not publish annual financial statements on the company's website 
or IDX website during the 2016-2018 period. 
(1) 
4. 
Companies that did not disclose data relating to research variables and Which were 
not completely available (overall data not available on publication during the 2016-
2018 periods). 
(7) 
Total companies that meet the criteria 51 
Data outlier when processing data (13) 
Total Sample 38 x 3 = 114 
Source: The Processed Secondary Data (2020) 
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All components of risk from fraud diamond theory cannot be observed directly. The pressure is proxy by financial 
targets (ROA), the opportunity is proxy by nature of the industry (Receivable), rationalization is proxy by auditor change 
(∆CPA), and capability is proxy by director replacement (DCHANGE), as well as corporate governance mechanisms 
proxy with boards of commissioners, independent commissioners, institutional ownership and audit committees. 
Table 2: Operational Definition of Variables 
 Variables Definition Indicators Scale References 
Fraudulent 
Financial 
Reporting 
(F-Score) 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
This research is conducted to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting by using 
the fraud score model as specified by 
(Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011). 
F-Score 
Code 1 for companies 
commit fraudulent 
financial reporting, 
Code 0 non-fraudulent 
financial reporting 
Nominal Nugraheni & 
Triatmoko, 
(2016) 
Financial Target 
(ROA) 
(Independent 
Variable) 
The ratio used to describe the net 
earnings earned by the company in the 
current year. 
ROA = 
Net Pro it A ter  ax
 otal Asset
 
Ratio (Skousen et 
al., (2009) 
Nature of 
Industry 
(Independent 
Variable) 
Risk factors that arise as a result of the 
economic environment and the policies 
in which the entity operates. 
Receivable = 
 eceivable
 t 
 ales  t 
- 
 eceivable
 t   
 ales t   
 
Ratio Skousen et 
al., (2009) 
Auditor Change 
(Independent 
Variable) 
Change of Public Accounting Firm 
(KAP) every year by the company  
(Skousen et al., 2009) 
Code 1 if there is an 
auditor change or KAP 
and if code 0 if there is 
no auditor change or 
KAP. 
Nominal Utomo et al., 
(2018) 
(Sugita, 
2018) 
Change of 
Directors 
(Independent 
Variable) 
Transfer of authority and responsibility 
from the old board of directors to the 
new board of directors. 
Code 1 is a change 
director and code 0 if 
no change directors. 
Nominal Zaki, (2017) 
Board of 
Commissioners 
(Moderating 
Variable) 
The board of commissioners has the 
authority and responsibility in 
overseeing, directing, and controlling the 
management of company resources. 
A number of the 
company's board of 
commissioners. 
Nominal Pamungkas 
et al.,2018) 
Independent 
Commissioners 
(Moderating 
Variable) 
Members of the board of commissioners 
who are not affiliated with the 
controlling shareholder, between the 
commissioners, management, and other 
parties who are able to influence their 
ability to be independent. 
A number of 
independent 
commissioners from 
outside the company. 
Nominal Pamungkas 
et al.,(2018) 
Institutional 
Ownership 
(Moderating 
Variable) 
Institutional ownership has the ability to 
control management through effective 
supervision so as to minimize fraud on 
the company. 
KI= 
 otal instit tional share
 otal o tstanding share
 
Ratio Pamungkas 
et al.,(2018) 
Audit 
committee 
(Moderating 
Variable) 
Having the responsibility to oversee 
financial statements, supervise external 
audits, and observe internal control 
systems in order to reduce the 
opportunistic nature of management. 
Number of audit 
committees 
Nominal Utomo et al., 
(2018) 
(Sugita, 
2018) 
Source: The Processed Secondary Data (2020) 
This study uses inferential statistical analysis for hypothesis testing. The method used to test the hypotheses in this study 
is a multivariate analysis using logistic regression because this research variable is a combination of metric and non-
metric (nominal). Logistic regression is a regression to test the extent to which the probability of the occurrence of a 
dependent variable can be predicted with an independent variable. Hypothesis testing in this study uses logistic 
regression by ignoring the tests of normality, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation. Because before testing the 
hypothesis, the first step that must be done is to assess the feasibility of the regression model and to assess the fit model. 
The function of assessing the feasibility of the regression model and model fit is a substitute for the classical assumption 
test.  
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Research using logistic regression ignores the testing of normality for the independent variable. Regression model 1 is a 
factor that influences fraudulent financial reporting and in model 2 which is by analysis technique based on interaction 
regression. The logistic regression model in testing the hypothesis in model 1 is Ln 
 
    
 = β0 + β x  + β2x2 + β3x3 + 
β4x4 + e and hypothesis testing in model 2 is Ln 
 
    
 = β0 + β x  + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + e. Ln 
 
    
 is a dummy 
variable, where companies that commit fraudulent financial reporting are represented by 1 and companies that do not 
commit fraudulent financial reporting are represented by 0, X1= Financial Target, X2= Nature of Industry, X3= Auditors 
Change, X4= Change of Directors, X5= Board of Commissioners, X6= Independent Commissioner, X7= Institutional 
Ownership, X8= A dit Committee, β , β2, β3, β4, β5, and (regression coefficient) and e= error. The result of the SPSS 
output, this testing was carried out with various stages that must be passed. First, assessing Hosmer and Lemes how 
Goodness of the fittest or the feasibility of the regression model. Second, the coefficient of determination. Third, the 
Overall Fit model. Next, the descriptive statistical analysis which includes sample size, average, maximum, and 
minimum, and standard deviation. 
RESULTS/FINDINGS 
Descriptive statistics and logistic regression are statistics used to analyze data by describing collected data as it is 
without the intention of making inferences that are applicable to the public or generalizations. Table 3, presents 
descriptive statistics and Table 4, present hypothesis testing using logistic regression. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Financial Target 114 -.06 .16 .0388 .04260 
Nature of Industry 114 -4.56 8.37 .1693 1.47489 
Auditor Change 114 0 1 .25 .432 
Change of Directors 114 0 1 .13 .340 
Board of Commissioner 114 2 8 4.14 1.534 
Independent Commissioner 114 0 4 1.40 .606 
Institutional Ownership 114 .08 .97 .6528 .20335 
Audit Committee 114 1 5 2.97 .488 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 114 0 1 .36 .482 
Source: Secondary data processed (2020) 
Table 4: Result of Hypothesis 
Variables Significance Description 
X  → Y 0.693 Hypothesis Rejected 
X2 → Y 0.374 Hypothesis Rejected 
X3 → Y 0.620 Hypothesis Rejected 
X4 → Y 0.780 Hypothesis Rejected 
XI*Z  → Y 0.033 Hypothesis Accepted 
X2*Z  → Y 0.086 Hypothesis Rejected 
X3*Z  → Y 0.100 Hypothesis Rejected 
X4*Z  → Y 0.227 Hypothesis Rejected 
X *Z2 → Y 0.012 Hypothesis Accepted 
X2*Z2 → Y 0.089 Hypothesis Rejected 
X3*Z2 → Y 0.999 Hypothesis Rejected 
X4*Z2 → Y 0.367 Hypothesis Rejected 
X *Z3 → Y 0.034 Hypothesis Accepted 
X2*Z3 → Y 0.274 Hypothesis Rejected 
X3*Z3 → Y 0.268 Hypothesis Rejected 
X4*Z3 → Y 0.827 Hypothesis Rejected 
X *Z4 → Y 0.346 Hypothesis Rejected 
X2*Z4 → Y 0.859 Hypothesis Rejected 
X3*Z4 → Y 0.615 Hypothesis Rejected 
X4*Z4 → Y 0.997 Hypothesis Rejected 
Source: Secondary data processed (2020) 
Based on hypothesis testing, the results of this study are financial targets, nature of the industry, auditor change and 
substitution of directors have no significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. The board of commissioners, 
Independent commissioners can significantly moderate the effect of financial targets on fraudulent financial reporting. 
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The board of commissioners cannot significantly moderate the influence of the nature of the industry on fraudulent 
financial reporting. The board of commissioners, independent commissioners, institutional ownership cannot 
significantly moderate the effect of auditor's change on fraudulent financial reporting. The board of commissioners, 
institutional ownership, audit committee cannot significantly moderate the effect of change of directors on fraudulent 
financial reporting. Independent commissioners, institutional ownership, the audit committee cannot significantly 
moderate the effect of the nature of industry on fraudulent financial reporting. Institutional ownership can significantly 
moderate the effect of financial targets on fraudulent financial reporting. The audit committee cannot significantly 
moderate the effect of financial targets on fraudulent financial reporting.  
DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS 
Empirically the financial target does not influence the fraudulent financial reporting. Manurung & Hardika, (2015) that 
an increase in company profitability can also be done by improving the quality of the company's operations. Annisya et 
al., (2016); Manurung & Hardika, (2015); Pamungkas et al., (2018) which states that financial targets do not have a 
significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. However, this study contrasts with the findings of (Mardiani et al., 
2017; Nugraheni & Triatmoko, 2016; Santoso, 2019). The nature of the industry has no effect on fraudulent financial 
reporting. The results of this study are in line with research conducted by Annisya et al., (2016); Nugraheni & 
Triatmoko, (2016); Skousen et al., 2009) which states that the nature of the industry does not significantly influence the 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
The effect of auditor change is not significant in fraudulent financial reporting. However, the company made auditors 
change to show the company's performance which always looks good. Pamungkas et al., (2018), Mardiani et al., (2017), 
and Zaki, (2017) state that auditor changes have no significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. The 
aforementioned change rules are still in effect until the emergence of Government Regulation Number 20 the Year 2015 
which explains the auditor's change to be made no later than for five consecutive financial years which come into force 
in April 2015. The change of directors does not influencefraudulent financial reporting. The results of this study are not 
in accordance with the theory of Wolfe &Hermanson, (2004) which states that the ability to influence acts of fraud. 
Santoso, (2019), Mardiani et al., (2017), Annisya et al., (2016), and Nugraheni & Triatmoko, (2017) who stated that the 
change of directors had no significant effect against fraudulent financial reporting. The higher effectiveness of 
monitoring will be able to minimize fraudulent financial reporting. 
The number of accounts receivable owned by the company will definitely reduce the amount of cash that can be used by 
the company for its operations (Utomo & Pamungkas, 2018). Board of commissioners cannot moderate the relationship 
between the nature of industry on the fraudulent financial reporting (Irwandi et al, 2019; Pamungkas & Utomo, 2018). 
This research is contrary to agency theory, where if companies change auditors more frequently, it will cause a higher 
conflict of interest between agents and principals. The adverse selection problem occurs because the agent has more 
extensive information about the company's condition than the principal so that the situation will be exploited by the 
agent to commit fraud (Dewi et al., 2018). Management will manipulate management performance information to make 
it look good and meet predetermined targets (Pamungkas et al., 2018). It can be concluded that the existence of an 
independent commissioner in a company will minimize fraudulent financial reporting. Monitoring and supervision 
conducted by an independent commissioner is not a guarantee that the company will not carry out fraudulent financial 
reporting. The results of this study are not in accordance with the theory of Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) which states 
that the ability to influence acts of fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of this study the board of commissioners, independent commissioners, institutional ownership are able to 
moderate the relationship between financial targets on fraudulent financial reporting. The higher the effectiveness of 
supervision carried out by the institution will be able to minimize the occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting in the 
company. Supervision carried out by institutional ownership is not a guarantee that the company will not carry out 
fraudulent financial reporting. Next, Financial targets set by the company are able to increase the possibility of 
management making fraudulent financial reporting. The existence of an audit committee in the company that can help 
directors in the case of company supervision is not a guarantee that the company will not carry out fraudulent financial 
reporting. 
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD 
In this study, there is a limitation that is the sample used only in the property and construction sector listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. Future studies are expected to be able to use a broader sample of other sectors, for more 
general results. Future studies can expand the observation period to a greater number of samples and be able to use other 
theories such as fraud pentagon theory. 
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